How does nancial integration impact capital accumulation, current-account dynamics, and cross-country inequality? This paper investigates this question within a two-country, generalequilibrium, incomplete-markets model that focuses on the importance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial riska risk that introduces, not only a precautionary motive for saving, but also a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital. Our contribution is then to show that this friction provides a simple explanation for the emergence of global imbalances, a simple resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails to ow from the rich or slowgrowing countries to the poor or fast-growing ones, and a distinct set of policy lessons regarding the intertemporal costs and benets of capital-account liberalization.
1 Introduction he lst two or three dedes hve een hrterized y signi(nt lierliztion of interntionl pitl )owsF hisD in turnD ppers to hve filitted the rise of signi(nt glol imlnes" lrge foreign det on the side of the nited ttes long with vst urreny reserves nd ig positive holdings of resury ills on the side of emerging ountries suh s ghinF purthermoreD wheres the stndrd neolssil prdigm predits tht pitl should e )owing from the rih to the poorD or from the lestEgrowing to the fstestEgrowing ountriesD the empiril evidene often suggests the opposite diretion of pitl )ows @qourinhs nd tenneD PHHTAF hese oservtionsD nd more generlly the themes of (nnil integrtion nd glol imlnesD hve motivted lrge ody of reserhF 1 sn this pperD we ontriute to this growing literture y studying the glol mroeonomi e'ets of (nnil integrtion in the presene of ertin mrket frition"uninsurle idiosynrti entrepreneuril riskF yur fous on this frition is motivtedD not only y the ft tht entrepreneurship is of ovious empiril relevneD ut lso y the oservtion tht this frition n ply ruil role in piE tl umultion nd produtivity growthF sndeedD this frition introdues oth preutionry motive for svingD s entrepreneurs seek to selfEinsure ginst the uninsurle risk in their inomeD nd wedge etween the interest rte nd the mrginl produt of pitlD s entrepreneurs require @privteA risk premium in ompenstion for the risk they fe in their entrepreneuril tivityF purthermoreD this wedge is likely to vry ross ountriesD withD syD entrepreneurs in ghin preE sumly enjoying less risk shring nd hene fing higher wedge thn those in the nited ttesF yur ontriution is to show how rossEountry di'erenes in this wedge my help explin numE er of stylized fts"suh s the persistene of rossEountry inequlityD the emergene of glol imlnesD nd the filure of pitl to )ow from the rih or slowEgrowing ountries to the poor or fstEgrowing ones"while lso providing distint set of poliy lessons regrding the dynmi e'ets of pitlEount lierliztionF 2 Preview of model. e ondut our theoretil exerise within trtleD generlEequiliriumD inompleteEmrkets modelF here re two eonomies @ountriesAD eh of whih is populted y ontinuum of households @fmiliesAF ih fmily inludes worker nd n entrepreneurF he worker supplies his lor in the domesti lor mrketY the entrepreneur runs privte usiness 1 See, e.g., Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2009), Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) , Boyd and Smith (1997), Broner and Ventura (2008) , Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) , Engel and Rogers (2006) , Fogli and Perri (2006), Gertler and Rogo (1990) , Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) , Gourinchas and Rey (2007) , Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006) , Hunt and Rebucci (2005) , Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) , Kraay et al. (2006) , McGrattan and Prescott (2007) , Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2008, 2009) , Obstefeld and Rogo (2004) , Reinhart and Rogo (2004) , and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2009). 2 Borrowing constraints, although not explicitly considered here, are complementary sources of a wedge between the external and the internal return to capital. This oers a useful re-interpretation of our contribution. As it will become clear, our key results hinge on the properties that the aforementioned wedge is positive and decreasing with wealthproperties that may hold whether the wedge originates in idiosyncratic risk or borrowing constraints. P tht opertes onstntEreturnsEtoEsle tehnologyD employs lor from the domesti lor mrketD nd uses the pitl stok owned y her fmilyF ell households n freely trde sfe ssetD ut n diversify only frtion of the idiosynrti shoks hitting their privte (rmsF he two ountries di'er in the mgnitude of the uninsurle risk"with the xorth enjoying etter riskE shring possiilities nd hene less risk thn the outh"ut re otherwise identilF ithin this modelD we de(ne (nnil utrhy s the regime in whih the mrket for the sfe sset lers on ountryEwide levelD nd (nnil integrtion s the regime in whih this mrket lers on worldEwide levelF e then study the stedy sttes tht otin under these two regimesD s well s the entire trnsitionl dynmis of the glol eonomy etween the two stedy sttesF Preview of results. nder (nnil utrhyD the outh fetures lower interest rteF his is due to the stronger demnd for preutionry sving implied y the lrger mount of undiversi(le idiosynrti risk @orD in n extensionD due to the lower supply of the sfe ssetAF hespite its lower interest rteD howeverD the outh my lso feture lower pitl stok nd lower level of inome thn the xorthF his is euse the outh fes higher wedge etween the mrginl produt of pitl nd the interest rteF st follows thtD prior to (nnil integrtionD the outh identi(es the poorD pitlEsre ountryD wheres the xorth identi(es the rihD pitlEundnt ountryF feuse the outh hs lower utrhi interest rte thn the xorthD (nnil integrtion triggers the xorth to run lrge urrentEount de(its ndD symmetrillyD the outh to umulte lrge positive foreign sset positionF sntuitivelyD this is euse the xorth hs omprtive dvntge in supplying the sfe ssetX the xorth exports this sset y running urrentEount de(itsF ht is moreD s (nnil integrtion uses interest rtes to rise in the outhD the opportunity ost of pitl goes up nd the pitl stok goes downD therey depressing domesti wges nd outputF gonverselyD the xorth experienes oomF sf the xorth is interpreted s the nited ttesD nd the outh s ghin or other emerging eonomiesD these results help explin the signi(nt glol imlnes tht the world eonomy hs experiened in reent historyF purthermoreD they help explin why (nnil gloliztion my initilly exerte rossEountry inequlityD nd why pitl my often fil to )ow from the rihD pitlEundnt ountries to the poorD pitlEsre onesF snterestinglyD thoughD the longErun e'ets of (nnil integrtion n e quite di'erentF feuse (nnil integrtion permits the outh to sve rod t higher returns thn otherwiseD the outh is le to umulte more nd more welth over timeF es this hppensD the willingness to tke risk inresesD the wedge etween the interest rte nd the mrginl produt of pitl fllsD nd the pitl stok inresesF es resultD in the new stedy stte the outh my well end up with higher levels of pitlD wgesD output nd onsumption thn in its utrhi stedy stteF yur model therefore predits tht (nnil integrtion my help poor ountries in the long runD even s it hurts them in the short run"nd my redue rossEountry inequlity in the long runD even s it inreses it in the short runF Q purthermoreD euse of the forementioned welth umultion nd the onsequent inrese in risk tkingD the trnsition in the outh my feture rellotion of sving from sfe ut lowE return investment opportunities to risky ut highEreturn onesF es resultD the outh experienes n elertion in its p growthD while the onverse is true for the xorthF elong with the property tht the outh runs urrentEount surplusesD while the xorth runs urrentEount de(itsD this result mens tht pitl )ows from the fster growing ountries to the slower growing ones" predition tht is the opposite of the one mde y the stndrd neolssil prdigm nd tht helps resolve the empiril puzzle doumented y qourinhs nd tenne @PHHVAF gominedD our results provideD not only possile explntion to ertin stylized ftsD ut lso distint poliy lessonX the ene(ts of pitlEount lierliztion for less developed eonomies my e higher in the long run thn in the short runF es lredy notedD the key intuition is tht (nnil integrtion helps gents in the outh umulte more welth over timeD whih in turn permits them to mitigte the frition they fe in their entrepreneuril tivitiesF e reinfore this intuition y studying the welfre e'ets of (nnil integrtion in our modelF pon (nnil integrtionD the outh9s poor tend to lose for two omplementry resonsX the inrese in interest rtes mens n inrese in the ost of orrowingY nd the initil out)ow of pitl mens redution in their wgesF sn ontrstD the middle lss nd the rih gin euse of the higher returns to their sving nd of the lower lor osts in their privte usinessesF fut s time psses nd pitl eventully rehes higher levels thn under utrhyD the resulting inrese in wges llevites the urden of ll poor gents nd even reverses the fortunes of some of themD so tht they too gin in the long runF yne ginD this highlights the distint shortErun nd longErun e'ets tht our nlysis rings to lightF 3 Related literature. yur pper elongs to lrgeD nd growingD literture tht uses fewleyE type models to study vrious mroeonomi implitions of inomplete mrketsF uey referenes inlude eiygri @IWWRAD ruggett @IWWUAD urusell nd mith @IWWVAD nd iosEull @IWWSAY see rethE oteD toreslettenD nd iolnte @PHHVA nd urusell nd mith @PHHTA for eleti reviewsF he ulk of this literture fouses on idiosynrti endowment or lorEinome riskF smportnt exeptions re engeletos nd glvet @PHHHD PHHTA nd engeletos @PHHUAD whih re mong the (rst ppers to emphsize the distint implitions of idiosynrti investment risk for ggregte sving within the ontext of the neolssil growth modelF 4 yur pper strts y extending engeletos @PHHUA to twoEountry openEeonomy settingF yur ontriution is then to study how rossEountry di'erenes in the level of idiosynrti investment risk impt glol mroeonomi dynmisF sn independent prllel workD gorneli @PHIHA undertkes similr exerise nd otins losely relted resultsF glosely relted in this regrd is wendozD udriniD nd iosEull @PHHVAF vike our pperD this work studies how rossEountry di'erenes in domesti risk shring n help explin signi(nt nd persistent glol imlnesF ee lso illen @PHHRA for n erlier tke on the sme key insightF roweverD unlike our pperD this work rules out endogenous pitl umultion ndGor idiosynE rti investment riskF 5 st is preisely the omintion of these two fetures tht distinguishes our theoretil exerise nd tht explins the novelty of our resultsF elso losely relted re fuer nd hin @PHIHA nd ndri @PHIHAF fuer nd hin9s model shres the two key fetures of our modelD nmely pitl umultion nd entrepreneuril riskD ut dds numer of other ingredientsD suh s orrowing onstrintsD ouptionl hoieD nd rossEsetionl distortions in the llotion of pitlF fy ssuming tht pitlEount lierliztion omes in tndem with struturl reform tht removes these distortionsD they otin n elertion in p growthF et the sme timeD surge in urrentEount surpluses ours for resons similr to oursF heir pper nd ours re thus highly omplementryF 6 ndriD on the other hndD onsiders oneE ountry model tht lso fetures entrepreneuril riskD ut fouses on di'erent poliy exeriseF sn prtiulrD he studies reform tht permits some gents to swith from frmers to entrepreneursF feuse entrepreneuril tivity is ssumed to fe more risk thn frmingD this mens n inrese in the level of idiosynrti risk nd hene surge in preutionry svingD whih in turn helps generte urrentEount surplusesF e similr mehnism opertes in grroll nd tene @PHHWAD exept tht there the driving fore is n inrese in idiosynrti lorEinome riskF yur pper lso shres with glleroD prhiD nd qourinhs @PHHVA the ide tht glol imE lnes re explinedD in ertin senseD y shortge of ssets in the outhF fut wheres tht pper ssumes tht the outh hs lower pity in supplying any ssetD we only ssume tht the xorth hs omprtive dvntge in supplying the reltively safer ssetsF his in turn n e the seD not euse of di'erent tehnologiesD ut simply euse the xorth hs weker demnd for preutionry svingF purthermoreD tht pper rules out pitl umultionD thus lso ruling out the distint dynmi e'ets tht re t the ore of our ontriutionF Layout. he rest of the pper is orgnized s followsF etion P introdues the model nd etion Q hrterizes the generl equiliriumF etion R studies the utrhi nd integrted stedy sttesD setion S the trnsitionl dynmis etween the twoD nd setion T the welfre implitionsF etion U onsiders useful extensionF etion V onludesF he proofs re delegted to the eppendixF 5 Mendoza et al. (2008) allow for a certain type of investment risk, but rule out capital accumulation: the investment opportunity in that paper is an exogenous Lucas tree. Mendoza et al. (2009) , on the other hand, allow for capital accumulation, but rule out idiosyncratic investment risk. Finally, Willen (2004) studies an endowment economy, thus ruling out both capital accumulation and idiosyncratic investment risk.
6 The comparative advantage of their paper is that it contains a richer quantitative exercise, while that of our analysis rests on its increased tractability and the consequent clarity of the theoretical insights. S 2 The model yur model is twoEountry vrint of the losedEeonomy model of engeletos @PHHUAF here re two ountriesD indexed y j ∈ {1, 2}, nd single goodD whih n e used for either onsumption or investment purposesF ih ountry is populted y ontinuum of in(nitelyElived householdsD indexed y i nd distriuted uniformly over [0, 1]F ih household inludes worker nd produer @entrepreneurAF he worker supplies his lor inelstilly to the domesti lor mrketF he entrepreneur runs privtelyEheld (rm @fmily usinessAF ih household n freely sve or orrow in the riskless ond"up to nturl orrowing onstrint"nd n umulte physil pitl within its own fmily usinessF pirms re hit y idiosynrti shoksD whih the households n only prtilly diversifyF pinllyD to mintin trtilityD we strt from ny ggregte unertintyF e lso let the time e ontinuousD indexed y t ∈ [0, ∞)F referenes tke n ipsteinEin spei(tionD whih permits us to distinguish intertemporl sustitution from risk versionF pix household i in ounty jF rer preferenes re de(ned s the limitD for ∆t → 0D of the solution to the following reursive spei(tionX
where β > 0 is the disount rteD γ > 0 is the oe0ient of reltive risk versionD nd θ > 0 is the elstiity of intertemporl sustitutionF 7
he (nnil welth of this householdD denoted y x ijt D is the sum of its holdings in privte pitlD k ijt D nd in the riskless ondD b ijt X
he evolution of x ijt is given y the following udget onstrintX
rereD dπ ijt is the household9s pitl inome @iFeFD the pro(ts from the privte (rm it ownsAD R jt is the interest rte on the riskless ondD ω jt is the wge rteD c ijt is the household9s onsumptionD nd dT ijt is trnsfer tht ptures riskEshring opportunities @to e de(ned lter onAF heres the sequenes of the wge nd the interest rte re deterministi @due to the sene of ggregte riskAD (rm pro(tsD nd hene household pitl inomeD re sujet to undiversi(ed 7 Standard expected utility is nested for θ = 1/γ; in this case, Uijt = Et We allow for θ = 1/γ so as to facilitate a more precise understanding of the underlying forces in our environment and a better calibration. However, none of our results rest on letting θ = 1/γ.
idiosynrti riskX
rereD n ijt is the mount of lor the (rm hires in the ompetitive lor mrketD δ is the men depreE ition rteD nd F is onstntEreturnsEtoEsle neolssil prodution funtionF por simpliityD we ssume goEhougls spei(tionX F (k, n) = k α n 1−α D with α ∈ (0, 1)F sdiosynrti risk is introdued through dz ijt D stndrd iener proess tht is iFiFdF ross gents nd timeF viterlly tkenD dz ijt represents stohsti depreitionD or produtivityD shokF roweverD we wish to interpret this shok more rodly s enompssing vrious soures of idiosynE rti risk in the entrepreneuril tivity ndD more generllyD in the returns to privte investmentF he slr σ j then prmeterizes the level of this risk in ountry jF ine this risk is purely idiosynrtiD gents would e le to otin full insurne ginst it if (nnil mrkets were ompleteF e numer of resons"morl hzrdD dverse seletionD ostly stte veri(tionD ine0ient legl nd enforement systemsD or mere lk of sophistition"my explin why this does not hppen in the rel worldF sn this pperD s in most other ppers in the fewley trditionD we strt from the deeper miroEfoundtions of inomplete mrketsF snstedD we exogenously impose tht the ville riskEshring possiilities re limitedD nd more severely so in the outhF e pture this y ssuming thtX
for some λ j ∈ (0, 1)F his ssumption n lso e justi(ed y introduing n exogenous sset struture tht permits gents to diversify only ertin omponents of their idiosynrti riskD or y letting them sell equity on only frtion of their pro(tsF iither wyD the slr λ j mesures the frtion of idiosynrti risk tht gents re le to diversify in ountry jY this is wht de(nes the level of (nnil development in our modelF gomining onditions @QAE@SAD we get tht the household udget redues toX
where
st is then evident tht the quntityσ j ≡ (1 − λ j )σ j mesures the mount of undiversi(le idiosynE rti risk in ountry jF e heneforth imposeσ 2 <σ 1 D whih permit us to identify ountry I s the ountry with lower level of uninsurle entrepreneuril risk"ndD in this prtiulr senseD s the ountry with the more dvned (nnil mrketsF e ordingly refer to ountry I s the xorth or the developed eonomyD nd to ountry P s the outh or the developing eonomyF 
such that the following are true: (i) individual plans are optimal given the sequences of prices; (ii) macroeconomic quantities are obtained by aggregating individual plans; (iii) labor and bond markets clear at the country level, namely N jt = 1 and B jt = 0 for all j, t.
Denition 2. An integrated equilibrium consists of a deterministic sequence of word-wide interest rates, {R t } t∈[0,∞) , a deterministic sequence of country-specic wages and macroeconomic quan-
, and a collection of individual contingent plans,
, 2}, such that the following are true: (i) individual plans are optimal given the sequences of prices; (ii) macroeconomic quantities are obtained by aggregating individual plans; (iii) labor markets clear at the country level, namely N jt = 1 for all j, t; (iv) the bond market clears at the world level, namely B 1t + B 2t = 0 for all t.
sn the remining of this setionD we (rst hrterize the individul household9s prolem for given sequene of wges nd interest rtesF e then proeed to hrterize the generl equilirium under oth regimesF
Individual behavior ine employment is hosen fter the pitl stok hs een instlled nd the idiosynrti shok hs een oservedD optiml employment mximizes pro(ts stteEyEstteF purthermoreD y onstnt returns to sleD optiml employment nd pro(ts re liner in own pitlF e therefore hve thtX 
where m jt denotes the marginal propensity to consume and φ jt the marginal propensity to invest in private capital. The marginal propensity to consumer solves the following recursion:
j denotes the risk-adjusted return to saving and ρ jt ≡ φ trjt + (1 − φ jt )R t the mean return to saving. Finally, the marginal propensity to invest is given by
. @IHA gondition (8) estlishes the linerity of optiml onsumptionD pitl nd ond holdings in welthF gondition (10) identi(es the propensity to invest in the risky sset s n inresing funtion of the risk premiumD µ t ≡r t − R t D nd deresing funtion of the mount of uninsurle riskD σ j = (1 − λ j )σF pinllyD ondition @WA is essentilly the iuler onditionX it desries the growth rte of the mrginl propensity to onsume s funtion of the ntiipted pth of riskEdjusted returns to svingF 8
we hve tht the equilirium vlues of the propensity to invest nd the riskEdjusted return to sving re given y φ jt = φ(K jt , R t ,σ j ) nd
purthermoreD the equilirium wge stis(es
. sing these ftsD ggregting the poliy rules of the gentsD nd imposing mrket lering for the riskEfree ondD we rrive t the following trtle hrteriztion of the generl equilirium of the eonomyF Proposition 1. In either the autarchic or the integrated equilibrium, the aggregate dynamics of country j satisfy the following ODE system
The autarchic equilibrium is then obtained by letting R 1t = R 2t and requiring that, for each j, R jt adjusts so that
In contrast, the integrated equilibrium is obtained by imposing R 1t = R 2t = R t and requiring that R t adjusts so that ( 
re two importnt hngesF pirstD the preutionry motive for sving introdues positive drift in onsumption growthD represented y the term 1 2 γσ 2 j φ 2 jt in the iuler ondition @IPAF his is the key fore in fewleyEtype models suh s eiygri @IWWRA nd wendoz et lF @PHHVAF eondD the ft tht investment is sujet to undiversi(le idiosynrti risk introdues wedge etween the riskEfree rte nd the mrginl produt of pitlD so tht R jt <ρ jt < f (K jt ) − δF his wedge plys ruil role in the results of our pper nd distinguishes it from the forementioned workF 4 Steady state sn this setion we (rst explin how longErun welth umultion impts the wedge etween the interest rte nd the mrginl produt of pitlD nd therey the stedyEstte level of pitl for given interest rteF his identi(es the key mehnism ehind the longErun e'ets in our frmeworkF e then omplete the hrteriztion of the utrhi nd integrted stedy sttes y studying the determintion of the interest rteF 4.1
Long-run wealth accumulation and the wedge on investment sn stedy stteD whether under utrhy or under integrtionD the growth rte of ggregte onE sumption in eh ountry must e zeroF he iuler ondition @IPA then redues to the followingX
his ondition simply requires tht the riskEdjusted return to sving in ountry j e lower thn the disount rte s muh s it tkes for the ssoited negtive intertemporl sustitution e'et to just o'set the positive preutionry motiveF sing the fts thtρ
. @IVA e infer tht this ondition pins down the omintions of the domesti pitl stok nd the interest rte tht re onsistent with sttionrity of ggregte onsumption"equivlentlyD with sttionrity of ggregte welth"in ountry jF sf there were no uninsurle idiosynrti risk (σ = 0)D ondition @IVA would hve redued to the fmilir ondition f (K) − δ = RY tht isD the mrginl produt of pitl would hve een equted to the interest rteF purthermoreD this would hve implied tht the pitl stok is deresing funtion of the interest rteF xowD instedD we hve tht the mrginl produt of pitl exeeds the interest rteX f (K) − δ > RF his is euse gents require positive risk premium in order II to e willing to hold their risky entrepreneuril pitlF sn dditionD the stedyEstte vlue of this premiumD whih is given y the squreEroot term in @IVAD is deresing in the interest rteF his is euse higher interest rte permits the domesti gents to umulte more welth in the long runD whih in turn inreses their willingness to tke risk nd therey redues the wedge etween the interest rte the mrginl produt of pitlF sndeedD for ny given initil level of ggregte welthD higher interest rte neessrily inreses the men return to sving nd therefore lso inreses the level of ggregte welth in susequent periodsF st follows tht the longErun level of ggregte welth lso inresesF he umultion of more welthD in turnD inreses gents9 willingness to tke risk"due to diminishing solute risk version"nd therey redues the premium they require in order to hold ny given mount of pitlF reneD the overll impt of the interest rte on pitl umultion is now miguousX higher interest rte my tully indue more investment in the long runD due to the welth e'et on risk tkingF his welth nd riskEtking e'et plys entrl role in the results of our pperY we will revisit it shortlyF qoing k to the determintion of the stedy stteD we now note thtD euse the interest rte nd the wge re onstnt in stedy stteD the present vlue of lor inome is lso onstntF sn prtiulrD it is given y H j = (1 − α)f (K j )/R j F sing this into ondition @IRAD we infer tht ggregte ond holdings"equivlentlyD the net foreign sset position"of ountry j stisfy the following onditionX
gomining this result with the one in ondition @IVAD we reh the following lemmF Lemma 2. (i) There exist continuous functions K, B : (0, β) × R + → R such that, under either autarchy or integration, the steady-state levels of aggregate capital and bond holdings satisfy
These functions are dened by
, which in turn is true if and only if R >R(σ),
IP rt @iA follows from onditions @IVA nd @IWAF he funtions K nd B giveD respetivelyD the domesti pitl stok nd the net foreignEsset position tht re onsistent with sttionrity of ggregte welth when the interest rte is R nd the level of risk is σF hese funtions will turn out to e prtiulrly helpful in the hrteriztion of the stedy sttesF rts @iiA through @ivA then provide us with the omprtive sttis of these funtions with respet to the interest rte nd the level of riskF rt @iiAD in prtiulrD estlishes tht the stedyEstte pitl stok is Eshped funtion of the interest rteF ht lies ehind this E shped reltion is our welthEndEriskEtking e'etX for su0iently high RD this e'et domintes the fmilir opportunityEost e'etD gurnteeing tht higher interest rte increases the pitl stok in the stedy stteF his result plys ruil role in our susequent nlysisF rt @ivAD thenD omplements this result y showing thtD s the interest rte inresesD the propensity to sve in the ond lso inresesX s the riskEfree rte inresesD sving in the riskless sset @ondA inreses relative to ggregte sving in the risky sset @pitlAF pinllyD prts @iiiA nd @vA estlish thtD for ny given interest rteD n inrese in the level of risk neessrily redues the stedyEstte pitl stokD while it inreses the propensity to sve in the ond s long s the interestErte is not too lowF hese properties ptureD respetivelyD the riskEversion nd preutionryEsving e'ets of higher idiosynrti riskF gominedD these results filitte the hrteriztion of the utrhi nd integrted stedy sttesF o shrpen this hrteriztionD we now introdue the following ssumptionD whih we will invoke for suset of our resultsF Assumption 1. Suppose that either of the following conditions holds:
where s aut
is the autarchic steady-state saving rate of country j.
his ssumption requires either @iA tht the uninsurle idiosynrti risk exeeds some miniml levelD or @iiA tht the elstiity of intertemporl sustitutionD θD is su0iently high reltive to sving rtesF st n e shown tht the former property implies the ltter @see eppendixAF he dvntge of the former property is tht it is stted in terms of purely exogenous prmetersD thus gurnteeing the existene of eonomies for whih the ssumption holdsF he dvntge of the ltter property is tht it n esily e mpped to dtF sn prtiulrD onsider the following kEofEthe envelope exeriseF sing dtD we n set α ≈ .36 nd s aut ≈ .23F st then follows tht essumption I is stis(ed for the nited ttes if θ > .2F
por ountries with higher sving rtesD this ondition might e stis(ed for even lower vlues of θF ine most reent estimtes of θ re lmost lwys ove .5D nd often ove 1D we onlude tht solves B(R aut j ,σ j ) = 0, and satisfy
whereR is the complete-markets interest rate,R = β.
(ii) The autarchic capital stocks are given by
whereK is the complete-markets capital stock, dened by f (K) = β + δ.
(iii) The autarchic consumption levels are given by
whereC is the complete-markets consumption level, dened byC = f (K) − δK .
he existene nd the uniqueness of the utrhi stedy stte follow from the ontinuity nd monotoniity of the funtion B with respet to R @whih we estlished in vemm PAD long with pproprite limit properties @whih we estlish in the eppendixAF rt @iA hrterizes the stedyEstte levels of the interest rteX it estlishes tht the interest rte is lower thn the disount rte in oth ountriesD nd more so in the outh thn in the xorthF he (rst propertyD nmely tht the utrhi interest rtes re lower thn the disount rteD re)ets the presene of preutionry motive for svingF es noted erlierD this is similr to eiygri @IWWRA nd wendoz et lF @PHHVAF he seond propertyD tht the interest rte in the outh is lower thn the one in the xorthD is then onsequene of the ft tht the preutionry motive is stronger in the outhD due to the higher level of idiosynrti riskF pormllyD this is ptured y the monotoniity of the funtion B with respet to σX the higher the level of undiversi(le idiosynrti riskD the higher the stedyEstte demnd for the riskEfree sset for ny given RY ut sine the net supply of IR this sset is zero when the eonomy is in utrhyD it must e tht the utrhi interest rte is lower the higher is σF his result is lso illustrted in pigure IF he interest rte is on the horizontl xisF he solid line is the urve B for the xorthY the dshed line is the urve B for the outhF hese urves n e interpreted s the ggregte demnd for the sfe sset in eh ountry @normlizedD thoughD y the orresponding pitl stoksAF foth urves re inresing in RD ut the one for the outh lies ove the one for the xorthD re)eting the stronger preutionry motive in the outhF he utrhi stedyEstte interest rtes re given y the intersetions of the two urves with the horizontl zero lineF glerlyD the outh hs lower utrhi interest rteD R aut 2 < R aut 1 F rt @iiA hrterizes the stedyEstte levels of the pitl stokX it estlishesD under essumpE tion ID tht the pitl stok is lower thn its ompleteEmrkets ounterprt in oth ountriesD nd more so in the outh thn in the xorthF he (rst propertyD nmely tht the utrhi pitl stoks re lower thn their ompleteEmrkets ounterprtsD revisits the key result in engeletos @PHHTAF es mentioned in the introdutionD this is ore predition tht di'erentites our frmework from prior workD inluding eiygri @IWWRAD urusell nd mith @IWWVAD wendoz et lF @PHHVD PHHWAD nd most other fewleyEtype models where inomplete risk shring is typilly ssoited with higher pitl umultionF purthermoreD this predition is oviously more onsistent with the dt thn the lterntive fetured in the forementioned lss of modelsX our frmework predits tht the lest (nnilly developed ountries re the poorest onesD not the rihest onesF he key for this di'erene is the type of risk fetured in those models versus the type of risk in our modelF sn those modelsD gents fe only idiosynrti lorEinome riskF his risk introdues preutionry motive for svingD whih redues the interest rteD ut does not rek the equlity etween the interest rte nd the mrginl produt of pitlF sn ontrstD our model fetures entrepreneurilD or pitlEinomeD riskF his risk introdues not only preutionry motiveD ut lso positive wedge etween the interest rte nd the mrginl produt of pitlY this wedge is the risk premium on privte investmentF st follows thtD while inomplete riskEshring neessrily enourges more pitl umultion in fewley models y reduing the interest rteD it n disE ourge pitl umultion in our model y introduing the riskEpremium wedgeF he onditions in essumption I then su0e for this wedge to dominte the redution in the interest rteD thus gurnteeing tht the pitl stok is lower thn under omplete mrketsF pinllyD the result tht the utrhi pitl stok is lower in the outh thn in the xorth re)ets the ft tht the wedge is higher in the outhF pormllyD this lst result follows omining the fts tht σ is higher in the outhD tht R is lower in the outhD tht the funtion K is neessrily deresing in σD nd thtD under essumption ID this funtion is lso inresing in R for ll R ≥ R aut j F pinllyD prt @iiiA hrterizes the stedyEstte level of onsumptionX it estlishesD under esE sumption ID tht the ggregte level of onsumption is lower thn its ompleteEmrkets ounterprt in oth ountriesD nd more so in the outh thn in the xorthF IS gominedD the ove results show thtD under utrhyD the outh"the eonomy with more severe (nnil fritions"fetures lower riskEfree rteD higher mrginl produt of pitlD nd lower levels of ggregte pitlD welth nd onsumptionF 4.3 Financial integration e now proeed to our seond min resultD the hrteriztion of the integrted stedy stteF Proposition 3. An integrated steady state exists, and it necessarily features the following properties:
(i) The interest rate is given by R int , where R int solves j∈{1,2} B(R int ,σ j )K(R int ,σ j ) = 0, and satises
(ii) The foreign asset positions are given by B int
and satisfy
(iii) The capital stocks are given by
(iv) The consumption levels are given by
rt @iA estlishes tht the interest rte in the integrted stedy stte flls etween the two utrhi vluesD while prt @iiA sttes tht in the integrted stedy stte the outh is net reditorD while the xorth is net detorF es we will see in the next setionD this stedyEstte position is ttined fter long trnsition throughout whih the xorth runs persistent urrentEount de(its @ndD symmetrillyD the outh runs persistent urrentEount surplusesAF hese two results ontin the explntion tht our model o'ers for glol imlnesX Corollary 1. Along the transition from the autarchic to the integrated steady state, the North must accumulate a negative foreign asset position, that is, it must run a series of current-account decits.
sntuitivelyD this is euse the xorth hs omprtive dvntge in supplying the riskless ssetF wore preiselyD the utrhi prie of the riskless sset is lower @iFeFD the utrhi interest rte is higherA in the xorth thn in the outh euse of the weker preutionry motive in the xorthF ixtrpolting from stndrd trde theoryD one would thus expet tht the xorth will eome net supplier of the riskless sset one the two ountries re llowed to trdeF yf ourseD this intuition ould hve een misleding oth euse we re tlking here out pitl )wsD not goods trdeD IT nd euse of the rih dynmis tht re involved in our environmentF xeverthelessD our results show tht this si intuition is lrgely orretF rts @iiA nd @iiiA then study the longErun implitions of (nnil integrtion for eonomi tivity nd worldEwide inequlityF sn prtiulrD prt @iiA estlishes tht the outh hs higher pitl stok in the integrted stedy stte thn in the utrhi oneF pormllyD this is diret implition of our erlier result in vemm P tht the funtion K is inresing in RF wore intuitivelyD this is euse of the dynmis of welth umultion tht we highlighted erlierX gents in the outh enjoy higher pitl stok in the integrted stedy stte euse prolonged ess to higher sfe returns permits them to umulte more welthD nd therefore to tke more riskF he onverse is true for the xorthF rt @ivA spells out the implitions for ggregte onsumptionF he outh enjoys higher level of onsumption in the integrted stedy stte thn under utrhyD oth euse it hs umulted more pitl domestilly nd euse it hs umulted positive position ginst the xorthF yne ginD the onverse is true for the xorthF glerlyD similr properties s those for pitl nd onsumption hold if we look t qhD wgesD nd lor produtivityF his gives the key predition of our model regrding the longErun impt of (nnil integrtion on rossEountry inequlityX Corollary 2. In the long run, nancial integration reduces cross-country inequality. es we will see nextD howeverD the shortErun e'ets re quite di'erentF 5 Transitional dynamics and numerical example sn this setion we exmine in more detil the dynmi responses of the two ountries to the inteE grtion of their (nnil mrketsD strting from n initil position tht oinides with the utrhi stedy sttesF por this purposeD we heneforth hve to ndon generlity nd fous on prtiulr numeril exeriseF hile we se this numeril exerise on somewht plusile lirtion of the modelD we invite the reder not to fous on the preise numersX the simpliity of our model nd dt limittions prelude rihD serious quntittive ssessmentF ht eing sidD the numeril exerise indites tht the e'ets n e of nonEtrivil mgnitudeF purthermoreD the qulittive ptterns we identify with this prtiulr numeril exerise re extremely roustX s one should ntiipte from our erlier theoretil resultsD they otin for wide rnge of prmeters tht we hve experimented with s long s essumption I is mintinedF 5.1 Parameterization he two eonomies re prmeterized y (α, β, γ, δ, θ,σ 1 ,σ 2 )D where α is the inome shre of pitlD β is the disount rteD γ is the oe0ient of reltive risk versionD δ is the depreition rteD IU θ is the elstiity of intertemporl sustitutionD ndσ j is the undiversi(le risk in ountry jF he time period is interpreted s one yerF ell the preferene nd tehnology prmeters re set in mnner tht is rodly onsistent with the mro nd mroE(nne literturesF sn prtiulrD the disount rte is β = 0.05F he elstiity of intertemporl sustitution is θ = 1D
vlue rodly onsistent with reent miro nd mro estimtesD 9 while the oe0ient of reltive risk version is hosen to e γ = 8D vlue ommonly used in the mroE(nne literture to help generte plusile risk premiF pinllyD the depreition rte is δ = 0.10 nd the shre of pitl in prodution is α = 0.40F his leves us withσ j orD equivlentlyD with σ j nd λ j F e (rst fous on σ j D whih we interpret s the idiosynrti voltility of the rte of return tht n individul entrepreneur fes in his investmentD regrdless of whether this risk is insurle or notF his interprettion is nlogous to the notion of idiosynrti voltility for stok mrket returnsD exept tht here we re primrily IV lest for puli (rmsAD this would suggest even higher vlues for σF gomining the ove oservtionsD nd interpreting the xorth in our model s the nited ttesD we onlude tht vlue for σ 1 ner 0.5 is plusile enhmrkF roweverD s lredy mentionedD the entrepreneur ould tully e le to diversify wy frtion λ of tht riskD so tht the voltility of the remining undiversi(le risk is in ft lower thn σF purthermoreD our model ssumes tht ll pitl is held in privte usinessesD wheres in relity n importnt frtion is held in pulilyEtrded ompniesF por these resonsD we next proeed to disuss the vlue of λ ndGorσF elthough we hve not expliitly modeled the distintion etween privte nd puli equityD 11 the following oneptul exerise provides possile mpping etween our model nd the dtF uppose tht eh household in our model is le to split its fmily usiness in two ounting identitiesF he oneD whih tkes frtion λ of the usiness9s output nd pro(tsD goes puliX it is sold in the mrket for its expeted vlueD so tht the household diversi(es the risk in tht omponentF he otherD whih tkes the residul (1 − λ) of the usiness9s output nd pro(tsD stys privteX the household hs to er the risk in tht omponentF his interprettion then suggests tht λ n e mthed to the rtio of puli (rm pro(ts over totl pro(ts in the nited ttesD where totl pro(ts re the sum of privtely held (rm pro(ts plus orporte pro(tsF sn the xtionl snome nd rodut eounts @xsesAD the rtio of proprietors9 pro(ts over totl pro(ts @proprietors plus orporteA is 47% on verge over the period IWVIEPHHTF his gives vlue for λ 1 round 0.5 or 0.6D whih is onsistent with other estimtes of the size of puli equity reltive to totl pitlF 12 pinllyD diret lirtion of the uninsurle riskσ 1 n e otined s followsF sn our modelD the idiosynrti voltility of individul onsumption growth is proportionl toσ 1 F e ould then sk wht is the vlue ofσ 1 tht mkes our model9s predition out idiosynrti onsumption voltility mth the one found in the dtF sing studies tht estimte this idiosynrti vrine of onsumption growth in dtD suh s eitEhli et lF @PHHIA nd wlloy et lF @PHHTAD we then infer tht the pproprite vlue forσ 1 is lose to 0.2F yn the sis of this oservtion nd ll the preeding disussionD we pik σ 1 = 0.5D λ 1 = 0.6 ndσ 1 ≡ (1 − λ 1 )σ 1 = 0.2 s our fvorle prmeteriztion for the xorthF urning to the outhD we note tht dt on entrepreneuril tivity nd idiosynrti investment risk re even more sre in developing ountries thn in the nited ttesF xeverthelessD there re multiple inditions tht idiosynrti risk is higher in developing ountriesF por lk of etter lterntiveD we ssume tht the overll mount of risk σ 2 in the outh is the sme s the one ssumed for the xorthF e then set λ 2 t the onservtive vlue of 0.2F his is t the upper rnge of ville estimtes of the rtio of puli equity to totl pitl in less dvned eonomies suh 11 Incidentally, note that this distinction is unclear in the data too, since ownership of many public companies is often concentrated in the hands of few key investors. e re now redy to ondut the experiment of interestD nmely reform tht lets the two eonomies integrte their (nnil mrkets @iFeFD to trde the riskless ssetAF his reform is ssumed to e unexpeted nd irreversileF fefore this reformD the two eonomies re ssumed to rest t their respetive utrhi stedy sttesF he ojetive is then to study the dynmis responses of these eonomies to this reformF rking the trnsitionl dynmis of inompleteEmrket models is often dunting exeriseF his is not the se hereD thnks to the low dimensionlity of the generlEequilirium system of our modelF sn prtiulrD note from vemm I thtD when θ = 1D the mrginl propensity to onsume out of totl welth redues to m jt = β for ll j, tF st then follows from roposition I tht the trnsitionl dynmis of the world eonomy n e redued to simple system of four (rstEorder yhi9s in (X jt , H jt ) j∈{1,2} D where X jt ≡ K jt + B jt F yur numeril lgorithm then works s followsF pirstD we solve for oth the utrhi nd the integrted stedyEstte ggregtesF xextD we numerilly solve the forementioned yhi system using the utrhi stedyEstte vlues of pitlD X j0 ≡ K aut j D s initil onditions nd the integrted stedyEstte vlues of humn welthD H int j D s terminl onditionsF he dynmi pth of the outh is illustrted in pigure PD nd tht of the xorth in pigure QF ime in yers is on the horizontl xisD nd levels of severl mroeonomi vriles re on the vertil xisF he dotted lines indite the levels of the vriles t the utrhi stedy stteF he dshed lines indite the levels of the vriles t the integrted stedy stteF he solid lines show the dynmi response of the vrilesF pigure P shows thtD immeditely upon integrtionD the pitl stok in the outh flls elow its utrhi stedyEstte levelF fut fter this initil fllD the pitl stok strts reoveringF sn ftD PH it is k to the utrhy level in out thirty yers nd it keeps inresing fter thtD eventully onverging to the newD higherD integrted stedy stteF sn other wordsD the outh fes lek piture in the short runD with signi(nt out)ow of pitl immeditely fter integrtionD ut this piture is reversed in the long runD s pitl strts )ying k into the ountryD eventully rehing higher level thn under utrhyF sn prtiulrD the pitl stok in the outh flls y lmost 4% immeditely fter integrtionD ompred to its utrhi stedy stteF futD t the longErun integrted stedy stteD the pitl stok in the outh hs inresed lmost 9% ove its utrhi levelF he sme qulittive piture is true for the other ggregte vrilesD suh s ggregte outputD onsumptionD nd the wgeF por exmpleD ggregte output in the outh flls y lmost 2% in the short runD nd it inreses y lmost 3% in the long runD ompred to its utrhi vlueF pigure Q demonstrtes the ext opposite piture for the xorthF smmeditely upon integrtionD the xorth experienes n in)ow of pitlD nd pitl remins ove its utrhi level for out (fty yersF roweverD in the long runD pitl settles t n integrted level lower thn the utrhi oneF he sme is true for the other ggregte vrilesF he interest rte jumps down from the utrhi stedy stte upon integrtionD nd it settles t n even lower level in the long runF pinllyD in the long run the xorth ends up orrowing from the outhF sn other wordsD the xorth experienes n initil period of prosperityD ut in the long run this piture is reversedF por exmpleD pitl in the xorth inreses y out 2.5% upon integrtionD ut it flls y out 5% in the longErun stedy stteD ompred to its utrhy levelF end ggregte output in the xorth inreses y 1% upon integrtionD ut it flls y 2% in the long runD ompred to utrhyF he intuition ehind these results is s followsF hile in utrhyD the outh fes higher levels of idiosynrti risk nd therefore fetures higher demnd for preutionry sving thn the xorthF his stronger preutionry motive keeps the domesti @riskEfreeA interest rte suppressed in the outh reltive to the xorthF pon integrtionD howeverD the preutionry sving of the outh is prtly sored y the xorthD implying tht the domesti interest rte hs to inrese in the outh @nd derese in the xorthAF his in turn hs very di'erent implitions for the mroeonomi outomes of the outh depending on whether we look t the short run or the long runF sn the short runD the inrese in interest rtes mens n inrese in the opportunity ost of pitlD using redution in the pitl stok of the outhF sn the long runD howeverD this inrese in interest rtes permits the residents of the outh to umulte more welthF es they do soD they eome willing to undertke more investment riskD whih explins why the pitl stok reovers over timeF he ft tht the pitl stok eventully inreses eyond its utrhi vlue then follows from roposition QF pinllyD note thtD long the trnsition to the new stedy stteD the outh runs signi(nt urrentEount surplusesD so tht it keeps inresing its (nnil position rodF gonverselyD the xorth runs signi(nt urrentEount de(itsD eventully rehing drmti level of foreign detD equl to out QFS times its qhF glerlyD this is the mnifesttion of the preutionry sving of PI the outh rushing for sfety in the xorthF yur (ndings thus provide novel perspetive on the ongoing dete on the osts nd ene(ts of pitlEmrket lierliztionF sn prtiulrD while mny fer tht suh reform my use n out)ow of pitlD nd while this fer seems to e vlidted y the reent emergene of glol imlnesD here we (nd tht this e'et my e reversed in the long run thnks to the endogenous umultion of pitlF Corollary 3. Financial integration can trigger an outow of capital from the poor country in the short run, thereby exacerbating cross-country inequality. These eects, however, are reversed in the long run.
6 Welfare implications sn this setion we exmine the welfre e'ets of integrtion within eh ountryF sn so doingD we re interested to distinguish how these e'ets my vry etween the poor nd the rihD 13 s well s ross di'erent genertionsF his motivtes us to onsider two exerisesF he (rst studies welfre t the moment the reform tkes pleD tking into ount the entire trnsitionl dynmis tht will followY the seond ompres welfre ross the two stedy sttesF wore preiselyD the (rst exerise seeks to nswer the following questionF uppose tht ountry rests in its utrhi stedy stte nd the urrent genertion ontempltes the option to undertke reform tht would let it integrte with the other ountryF ik prtiulr level of welthF ht is the miniml ompenstion n gent with tht prtiulr level of welth would e willing to ept in return for the filure of the reform to tke plec he seond exeriseD on the other hndD seeks to nswer the following questionF uppose tht future genertions re o'ered the option to e orn in the utrhi stedy stte versus e orn in the integrted stedy stteF pix prtiulr rnking in the welth distriution @syD the UEth perentileAF ht is the miniml ompenstion n gent with tht prtiulr rnking would hve to reeive under the utrhi stedy stte in order to e s hppy s n gent with the sme rnking under the integrted stedy sttec sn shortD the (rst exerise studies how (nnil integrtion impts the welfre of the poor nd the rih in the urrent genertionD while the seond exerise studies how it impts the welfre of the poor nd the rih in genertions in the distnt futureF 13 At this point, we note that our baseline model features an explosive level of wealth inequality within each country. This is because individual dynamics follow a random walk in steady state. To x this issue, we can modify the model to let some agents die with a constant Poison rate ν > 0 and get replaced with other agents who inherit the average level of wealth; see Panousi (2010) for further details on this approach. We can then adjust the subjective discount rate so that the eective discount rate, which is now β +ν, remains the same as in our baseline model. This guarantees that the aggregate dynamics of the modied model remain exactly the same as those of our baseline model, while at the same time the modied model admits a unique, well-dened steady-state wealth distribution. For our numerical exercise, we set ν = 1/150; this is motivated by the fact that the average mortality rate is about 1/75 per year and the fact that agents are imperfectly altruistic towards future generations. Table 2 : Welfare Eects. his tle summrizes the welfre e'ets of (nnil integrtion ross di'erent qurtiles of the welth distriutionF I is the (rst qurtileD P is the seond qurtileD nd so onF he numers is the ells of the tle report the withinEqurtile verges of the shortErun nd longErun ompensting di'erentilsF he ltter re mesured s perent of permnent inomeF he short run refers to welfre t the moment integrtion tkes pleD while the long run ompres welfre ross the utrhi nd integrted stedy sttesF @ee the min text for detiled de(nitionsFA
denote the vlue funtions tD respetivelyD the utrhi stedy stteD the time the reform inititesD nd the integrted stedy stteF he (rst welfre exerise is to omputeD for eh level of (nnil welth xD ompensting
is the level of welth tht orresponds to the sme reltive welth position under the integrted stedy stte s the one otined with welth x under the utrhi stedy stteF por either of these two exerisesD we then express the orresponding ompensting di'erentil s frtion of the gent9s permnent inomeF 14 he resulting numer represents welfre gin if it is positiveD nd s welfre loss if it is negtiveF pinllyD to (x lngugeD nd notwithstnding the ft tht oth exerises onern lifeEtime utilityD we refer to the e'ets tht re omputed with the (rst exerise s the shortErun welfre e'etsD nd to the ones tht otin from the seond exerise s the longErun welfre e'etsF hese welfre gins nd losses re then illustrted in le P nd in pigure RD for eh of the two ountries nd for di'erent levels of welthF le P summrizes the welfre gins nd losses ross the four di'erent qurtiles of the utrhi stedyEstte welth distriutionF pigure R gives similr ut (ner pitureD y illustrting the welfre e'ets ross ll perentiles of the welth distriutionF he solid line in this (gure represents the shortErun welfre e'ets @tht isD those otined y the (rst of the forementioned welfre exerisesAD while the dshed line represents the longErun welfre e'ets @tht isD those otined y the seond exeriseAF e (rst onsider the outhD whih is in pnel @A of pigure RF yn impt @solid lineAD (nnil integrtion ene(ts the rih t the expense of the poorX the poor of the urrent genertion su'er lossesD wheres the rih enjoy ginsF hese e'etsD howeverD re reversed in the long run @dshed lineAX the poor of future genertions re etter o' living under integrtion thn under utrhyD 14 That is, a number equal to, say, 5% means that the agent must receive either a lump sum equal to 5% of his eective wealth or, equivalently, a perpetuity with annual dividend equal to 5% of his permanent income. while the onverse is true for the rihF por exmpleD s shown in le PD gents t the ottom PS7 of the welth distriution su'er n verge loss equl to −8.5% of their permnent inome on imptD ut enjoy n verge gin of +3.8% in the long runF he orresponding numers for the top PS7 of the welth distriution re +0.9% nd −0.8%F he intuition ehind these results is s followsF sn the short runD (nnil integrtion uses the outh9s wges to fll nd its interest rtes to riseD s we hve seen in pigure PF foth these fores tend to redue the present disounted vlue of wgesD tht isD the humn welth of the householdsF sn turnD this hurts ll gentsD ut more so the poorer onesD sine lrger frtion of poor gents9 e'etive welth omes from lor inomeF et the sme timeD the redution in wges mens tht privte usiness now hve to fe low lor ostsD fore tht inreses the verge return on privte investmentF elong with the ft tht the interest rte hs lso inresedD this mens tht the overll return to sving hs inresedF his e'et tends to ene(t the rihD who hve lrge mounts of (nnil welth reltively to humn welthF sn our exmpleD this positive e'et is strong enough to o'set the negtive e'et of the redued humn welth for riher gentsD nd it explins why riher gents gin wheres poorer gents lose from integrtion t imptF sn the long runD on the other hndD wges eventully settle t higher level thn under utrhyF his tends to inrese humn welthF he inrese in interest rtes ontriutes in the opposite diretionD ut does not o'set the positive e'et of higher wgesF he longErun inrese in humn welth then ene(ts oth the poor nd the rihF elong with the ft tht the welth distriution shifts to the rightD this explins why the poor nd the middle lss of future genertions re most likely to ene(t from integrtionF he rihD howeverD my end up losing euse the new stedy stte is ssoited with higher lor osts nd lower men returns to entrepreneurshipF e next onsider the xorthD whih is illustrted in pnel @A of pigure RF sn the short run @solid lineAD the poor nd the middle lss ginD while the very rih loseF yne ginD these e'ets re reversed in the long run @dshed lineAX the poor lose nd the rih ginF por exmpleD s shown in le PD the ottom PS7 mke gin of +3.3% in the short run nd loss of −11.6% in the long runD while the top PS7 mke loss of −0.7% in the short run nd gin of +6.8% in the long runF he intuition for these results is nlogous to tht for the outhF he xorth9s poor gin immeditely upon integrtion euse of the inrese in humn welthD while the rih lose euse of the lower return to their ond holdings nd the higher lor osts in their privte usinessesF fut s time psses nd pitl strts going downD the onsequent redution in wges hurts the poorD while it ene(ts the rihD nd welfre e'ets re reversedF sn le QD we study the sensitivity of the forementioned (ndings to three vrint prmeteriE ztions of the modelF por simpliityD we fous on longErun welfre e'ets @omprisons ross stedy sttesAF he (rst vrint rises the level of uninsurle risk in the outhD fromσ 2 = 0.4 toσ 2 = 0.6F he seond vrint rises the inome shre of pitl in oth ountries to α = 0.7Y this is ment to pture the roder de(nition of pitl one my wish to use for longErun onsidertionsF he third Table 3 : Sensitivity analysis. his tle revisits the longErun welfre e'ets of (nnil inteE grtion for three lterntive prmeteriztions nd vrint poliy reformF vrint omines the forementioned two vrintsF sn ll sesD the poor ontinue to mke gins in the outh nd to su'er loses in the xorthF roweverD the poor9s gins in the outh now tend to e muh iggerD while the poor9s losses in the xorth re not muh di'erentF purthermoreD the longErun ene(ts of integrtion re now more widespred in the outhD with ll qurtiles tully gining in the lst two vrintsF xotwithstnding the limittions of our quntittive exerisesD these (ndings suggest tht the longErun welfre gins of pitlEount lierliztion re likely to e highest for eonomies where idiosynrti risk impts rod rnge of entrepreneurilD investmentD nd humnEpitl hoiesF pinllyD in the row olumn of le QD we return to the seline prmeteriztion ut onsider n lterntive poliy exeriseX we now ssume tht (nnil integrtion permits the outh to otin essD not only to the higher sfe returns of the xorthD ut lso to the improved riskEshring possiilities of the ltterF ht isD we let (nnil integrtion e ssoited with n inrese of λ 2 from 0.2 to 0.6D nd hene with redution in σ 2 from 0.4 to 0.2F he implied welfre gins re then muh igger thn those of our seline poliy exeriseD nd lso more widespred in the popultionF por exmpleD the ottom PS7 gin +40.2% insted of +3.8%D nd the top PS7 gin 13.9% insted of losing −0.8%D s in the enhmrkF his (nding undersores tht the ene(ts of pitlEount lierliztion for developing eonomies re likely to e mximl if the reform helps these ountries llevite their own genyD enforement nd institutionl prolems y gining ess to the more e0ient (nnil institutions of developed eonomiesF he numeril (ndings we hve reported in this setion reD of ourseD only illustrtiveF e serious quntittive exerise would require riher modelD one tht would llow for more soures of heteroE geneity @eFgFD di'erent levels of entrepreneuril ilityAD for diminishing returns in entrepreneuril investmentD nd for endogenous ouptionl nd edutionl hoiesF xeverthelessD the qulitE tive properties we hve unovered re likely to e roust nd highlight the distint shortErun nd longErun e'ets tht re t the fous of our nlysisF PS 7 TFP growth and shortage of assets sn this setion we disuss n extension of our model tht helps ommodte the ide tht developing ountries su'er from shortge of ssets @glleroD prhi nd qourinhsD PHHVAD unovers the possile implitions of our nlysis for p growthD nd helps resolve the puzzle tht pitl often )ows from fstEgrowing to slowEgrowing ountries @qourinhs nd tenneD PHHVAF his extension introdues sfe setorF he tehnology in this setor hs lower men return thn entrepreneuril tivityD ut entils no riskF yne n think of this sD syD frmingD or s some form of storge tehnologyF he roder ide here is tht entrepreneurs fe trdeEo' etween risk nd return s they hoose mong n rry of investment opportunities" trdeEo' tht is known to ply ruil role in ggregte p nd growth dynmis @eFgFD eemoglu nd illiottiD IWWUAF he prodution funtion in the sfe setor is ssumed to tke the form g j (M jt ) = A j M α jt D where M jt is the orresponding level of pitl nd A j is produtivity prmeter tht determines the size of the sfe setor reltive to tht of the riskyD entrepreneuril setorF 15 glerlyD the equilirium must now stisfy R jt = g j (M jt ) for eh ountry j nd ll periods tX the mrginl produt of pitl in the sfe setor is equted to the interest rteF his pins down the pitl stok of the sfe setor"whih n e interpreted s the supply of sfe ssets"s n inresing funtion of the interest rteF he rest of the equilirium hrteriztion then proeeds in similr lines s in our enhmrk modelD nd is omitted here euse of spe limittionsF gonsider now the following exeriseF estritσ 1 =σ 2 ut let 0 < A 2 < A 1 F vetting A 1 > A 2 ptures the ide tht the xorth my hve tehnologil or institutionl superiority in supplying the sfe ssetY restritingσ 1 =σ 2 seeks to isolte this possiility from the possiility of di'erentil levels of uninsurle entrepreneuril riskD the implitions of whih we hve lredy studiedF st is then possile to hek tht ll our (ndings ontinue to hold s eforeF sn prtiulrD the outh is poorer thn the xorth under oth utrhy nd integrtionY the xorth runs persistent urrentE ount de(its upon integrtionY pitl initilly )ies out of the outh nd into the xorth in the short runY nd (nlly this e'et is reversed in the long runF his extension thus o'ers diret reEinterprettion of the preeding nlysisX our results origiE nte interhngely in the reltively higher level of uninsurle risk fed y entrepreneurs in the outh ndGor in the reltive superiority of the xorth in supplying the glol eonomy with sfe stores of vlueF sn turnD this uilds ridge etween our pper nd glleroD prhi nd qourE inhs @PHHVAF vike this erlier workD our nlysis indites tht glol imlnes my originte from shortge of ssets in emerging ountriesF fut unlike this erlier workD our nlysis requires only shortge of the reltively sfe ssetsD not of all ssetsF sndeedD emerging eonomies pper to e produing lot of ssets in relityF etD most of these ssets re risky nd their residents seem to e serhing rod for sfer ssets suh s resury illsF st is thus the shortge of 15 That the safe sector does not employ labor is for simplicity. suh qulity ssetsD nd not of ll ssetsD tht explins why (nnil pitl my e )owing from emerging ountries to the nited ttes nd other dvned eonomiesF pinllyD our nlysis hs distint implition for ggregte p nd growth dynmisF o see thisD note tht long the trnsition from the utrhi to the integrted stedy stteD gents in the outh eome inresingly willing to tke riskF vike in our seline modeD this is euse the inrese in interest rtes indues gents in the outh to umulte more welthF fut now tht the gents fe hoie etween the sfe setor nd the riskyD entrepreneuril setorD this inrese in the willingness to tke risk lso mens rellotion of resoures from the sfe setor to the more riskyD ut lso more e0ientD entrepreneuril setorF es this hppensD the outh enjoys n inrese in pF gonverselyD euse the xorth deEumultes welth nd rellotes pitl wy from its entrepreneuril setorD it experienes drop in its pF his is illustrted in pigure SD whih shows the dynmis of p in the two ountries for numeril version of the extended modelF 16 elong with our model9s predition regrding urrentEount dynmisD this provides simple resolution to the empiril puzzle doumented y qourinhs nd tenne @PHHVAF his work showed thtD in the dtD pitl often ppers to )ow from ountries tht experiene higher produtivity growth to those tht experiene lower produtivity growthF hile this ft is inonsistent with the stndrd neolssil growth prdigmD it is esily ommodted in our modelF 17 8 Conclusion his pper studies the glol mroeonomi implitions of (nnil integrtion within trtle inompleteEmrkets model tht fetures uninsurle idiosynrti entrepreneuril risk" frition tht introduesD not only preutionry motive for svingD ut lso wedge etween the interest rte nd the mrginl produt of pitlF feuse of this wedgeD (nnilly underdeveloped eonomy @outh or ghinA n feture oth lower interest rte nd lower pitl stok under utrhy thn more dvned eonomy @xorth or AF es the two eonomies open up their pitl ountsD interest rtes rise in the outh nd fll in the xorthY the xorth strts running lrge urrentEount de(itsY nd the outh su'ers n out)ow of pitlF yver timeD howeverD integrtion permits the outh to umulte more welthD in prt y sving in the xorthF es this hppensD the ite of the forementioned frition diminishesF iventullyD this helps oost pitl umultion nd growthD therey reduing rossE 16 The numerical exercise here assumesσ1 =σ2 = .50, α = 0.7, and (A1, A2) chosen so that in autarchy the capital in the safe sector accounts for 50% of total capital in the North and for 20% of total capital in the South. Also, note that TFP growth is negative in the North and positive in the South, but both countries could feature positive TFP growth if we had allowed for an exogenous constant drift in technology. The robust prediction is that integration speeds up TFP growth in the South while it slows it down in the North.
17 In fact, if we focus on labor productivity (output per worker) rather than TFP, this statement holds true even for our baseline model: along the transition from the autarchic to the integrated steady states, the South experiences higher growth in physical capital and labor productivity than the North, and yet it is the North that is borrowing from the South. The extension of this section helps reinforce this point by establishing a similar property for TFP. ountry inequlity in the long runF gominedD these results provide simple explntion for the emergene of glol imlnesD simple resolution to the empiril puzzle tht pitl often fils to )ow from the rih or slowEgrowing to the poor or fstEgrowing ountriesD nd distint set of poliy lessons regrding the intertemporl osts nd ene(ts of pitlEount lierliztionF nderlying these (ndings re two key propertiesF pirstD positive wedge etween the mrginl produt of pitl nd the riskEfree rteF eondD the tendeny of this wedge to diminish s welth inresesF sn our modelD the (rst property is due to uninsurle idiosynrti investment riskY the seond property then follows from diminishing solute risk versionF snterestinglyD these properties my nturlly emerge lso in models with orrowing onstrintsF hese models feture positive wedge etween the mrginl produt of pitl @internl returnsA nd the interest rte fed y svers @externl returnsAD either euse onstrints ind now or euse they re expeted to ind in the futureF ht is moreD this wedge typilly flls with welthD s more welth helps overome urrent nd future orrowing onstrintsF e thus onjeture tht similr results would otin in vrint of our model tht would introdue relisti orrowing onstrints in ddition toD or in ple ofD the entrepreneuril risk tht we hve foused on in this pperF PV δ > βD it hs to e the se tht 1+θ ) −1/2 (β − R)F sing thisD we hve tht Kσ < 0F @ivA prom @IWA we hve tht
1+θ β) 1/2 is (nite nd hene oth φ(0) nd K(0) re (niteF st follows tht
xextD note thtD from @PIAD
where we suppress the dependene of K, µ, nd φ on R for nottionl simpliityF st follows tht
ine µ (R) < 0 nd R < f (K (R)) for ll R ∈ (0, β)D we hve tht ∂B/∂R > 0 for ll R ∈ (0, β)F @vA sing the formuls for µ(R) nd φ(R) from oveD we get
Proof of Proposition 2. @iA his prt follows from the proof of vemm PD prt @iiiAF he limits of B(R)D together with the ontinuity of B (R) in R, estlish the existene of n R tht solves B(R) = 0. his is in ft the unique stedyEstte RD sine B R > 0 lwysF @iiA he eqution B(R aut j ,σ j ) = 0 is simply ond mrket lering for eh ountryF nder essumption ID we re in the region where Bσ > 0F prom (1) we hve tht B = B/K ≡ DF sing proof similr to tht in roposition 1(iv)D we get tht D R < 0F reneD B R < 0F e lso hve tht Bσ = B R Rσ > 0D with B R < 0F hereforeD it hs to e tht Rσ < 0 in utrhyF sn other wordsD
@iiiA nder essumption ID we re in the region where
> 0F ine onsumption is inresing in pitlD we lso hve tht
Proof of Proposition 3. @iA gonsider the funtion WB(R) de(ned y
en integrted stedy stte is given y ny solution to WB(R) = 0F xote tht the funtion K is lwys positively vluedD while the funtion B n tke oth signs nd is inresing in R ndσF QI purthermoreD rell tht R aut 2 < R aut 1 F henever R ≤ R aut 2 (< R aut 1 )D y the monotoniity of B in R we hve tht B(R,σ 2 ) ≤ B(R aut 2 ,σ 2 ) = 0 nd B(R,σ 1 ) < B(R aut 2 ,σ 2 ) = 0Y it follows tht WB(R) < 0F imilrlyD whenever R ≥ R aut 1 D we hve tht WB(R) > 0F elong with the ft tht the funtion WB(R) is ontinuous in RD this implies tht solution R int to WB(R) = 0 lwys exists nd it neessrily stis(es R aut 2 < R int < R aut 1 F @iiA ine Kσ < 0D it follows tht K int 1 > K int 2 F ine essumption I ensures tht K R > 0D nd using @iAD we get the desired resultF @iiiA nder essumption ID we re in the re where Bσ > 0D whih implies tht B int 
